Friday, January 12, 2007

Why I despise Joe Lieberman, Hurricane Katrina Edition

Pre Election Joe Lieberman:
The massive Governmental failure that was the Hurricaine Katrina fiasco must be investigated thoroughly and people at all levels, President Bush included, must be held accountable

Post Election Joe Lieberman:

Letting the evidence show that the Bush Administration may be slightly inept would be dangerously partisan, and anyone who disagrees is in love with Osama.

Jesus Horatio Christ do I hate this assbag.

17 comments:

  1. This comment has been removed by the author.

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  3. Oh, man, you gotta love Frank! :-)

    eat franks, dick!

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  4. Oh hi frank, didnt see you there. Dont post hree often, so your little jibe that seems to be basically saying I have no friends went missed for the most part. Sorry about that, know you worked so hard to craft a quality missive. Where are you banned from though? OW? Any idea why?

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  6. There's always Pedro.

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  7. Oh my Frank, as Duros points out it looks like it might have had to do with you accusing S of being in a pedophiliac relationship. Turns out you arent a paragon of truth and integrity after all, but thank you oh so much for playing.

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  9. It's just that, Frank. Conjecture. Again, I am petitioning on your behalf. Remember that next time you call me names, ok? :-)

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  10. For the record,you two lying rumor mongers (I say that now because nimrod now believes you duros -- way to go): A catamite is not in a pedophiliac relationship.
    He is "a boy or youth who is in a sexual relationship with a man," the implication being that it is voluntary.
    An English major such as yourself can't be faulted for not knowing that, but you can be faulted for the hubris of relying on your memory (which, of course, has failed you) and not checking a dictionary.
    I guess you left school with the impression that you knew the meaning of every word in the English language.
    Duros: If you had any integrity, you would correct the misconception you have created.

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  11. Firstly, I believe the reason we have pedophilia laws is because of the general consensus that, for instance, a 12 year old boy cannot legally consent to being in a sexual relationship, being not of legally sound mind or somesuch. Secondly, for the relationship not to have been pedophilial would require that the older man to not be attracted to the boy at all, being as pedophilia is the attraction, and carries with it no necessary connotations of actual sexual activity, consensual or otherwise.

    So if this is frank here, and I have every reason to believe it is, you mind me asking why the hell you deleted your comments? They were ever so informative and enlightening.

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  12. Frank tells me you objected to the comments, so he removed them. Of course, you are wrong about the difference between a catamite and a victim of a pedophile.

    More importantly, even if a catamite were an exploding feline, the FACT is that it had nothing whatever with his banishment from the blog.

    He also tells me that he is somewhat relieved that he is free of that blog -- a case of not realizing you're addicted until you have to do without.

    He and I have begun to work on a big project with a techie friend of mine.

    It could be a total dud, or it could be as revolutionary as the advent of the PC.

    So I have no time, and neither does he, to spar with you on your blog.

    Goodbye and good luck.

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  13. I didnt object to his comments (unless he meant this) and certainly didnt ask him to remove his messages. My personal opinion is maybe he realized how crazy he got to sounding near the end, screaming at me about childishly insulting him the way I did. It may be capital FACT that him implying S was in a pedophiliac relationship, which a catamite de facto is, since pedophilia, as I point out, applys to the sexual attraction, unless you want to argue the older man in not a willing party in having sex with the underage child, but either way it was only my guess (and duros') at the time at any rate. I understand his not wanting to return though, if he feels it a waste of time, and we will mourn his passing, as well as his electing to remove all of his posts. Good luck revolutionizing the way we look at the world though now that you have all this time to focus. Ta.

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  14. Yes, for the record, I was in no way attempting to start a rumor as to the nature of Frank's banishment; I was simply asking if that particular statement was the cause of it.
    As I have told Frank, and you can tell him too, anon, I bear him no ill will. Never have.

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  15. You can leave this comment up, if you wish.

    mambochicken's B.S. about parsimony is in addition to being irrelevant, also tedious.
    I offer him this:"§ Parsimony Defined

    There are several ways of criticizing of the use of parsimony as a guiding principle in the search for knowledge. It could be argued that there is no clear and agreed-upon definition of 'parsimony' or 'simplicity.' The justification of parsimony's worth as a guiding principle can also be questioned. We must therefore first define the various forms of parsimony and show why it is needed as a scientific and philosophical guideline. To reduce confusion, parsimony and simplicity will be treated as synonyms.

    The principle of parsimony is sometimes called Ockham's Razor, named after a medieval philosopher who advanced the theory with such phrases as "plurality is not to be posited without necessity" and "what can be explained by the assumption of fewer things is vainly explained by the assumption of more things" (Boehner, 1957, p. xxi). It remains unclear from these passages just what these "things" really are. To alleviate some of this confusion, I will distinguish three types of parsimony.

    The first type of parsimony is epistemological parsimony. Epistemological parsimony deals with the number of things that a theory posits. These things can be either specific objects or more abstract processes. Consider, for example, Newton's law of gravitation in comparison to Kepler's three laws of planetary motion. Because Newton's law of gravity can explain Kepler's three laws in one formula, it is more epistemologically parsimonious. Because in this case Newton's law represents the theory with the fewer number of nomonological assumptions, epistemological parsimony could also be called nomonological parsimony.

    Epistemological parsimony is a concern among scientific theories. Science is the search for synthetic a posteriori truth. Absolute certainty, when dealing with synthetic facts, is certainty of the wrong kind. Science must always work from some assumed starting points and aim for practical certainty. Some foundations of scientific beliefs are the principle of induction, the criterion of falsiability, and the law of non-contradiction. Another one of these assumed starting points is the principle of parsimony. Without this rule, scientific theories would become needlessly complicated: "It will be recognized at once that a methodological rule requiring that, in any given situation, we choose the least simple of the admissible hypotheses would render us completely paralyzed" (Schlesinger, 1975, p. 333). Epistemological parsimony allows for the fewest number of nomonological assumptions (see "The Principle of Minimum Assumption" in Kapp, 1958). Parsimony is needed because, given observed data, more than one theory is possible: "it is easy to demonstrate that, given any amount of observational evidence, there always exist and infinite number of mutually incompatible theories that explain (entail, or, in cases of statistical explanation, imply statistically) the evidence at hand" (Maxwell, 1976, p. 567).

    An example of the use of the principle of epistemological parsimony is the revision of the geocentric model of the solar system:

    The success of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century astronomers at determining orbits and constructing predictive models of the heavens was not much greater than that of the third-century astronomer Ptolemy, who believed the Earth to be at the center of the universe. Ptolemy could get very good predictions with his geocentric model if he assumed the sun and the planets to be moving along several different circular orbits simultaneously. To understand this, think of a path of a speck on a wheel of a car driving in circles on a merry-go-round. This involved three circular orbits. Some seventy-five rotational motions in all were involved in explaining the trajectories of the planets, the speed of each one being estimated from direct observations combined with a set of formulae. By putting the sun at the center, Copernicus could reduce the number of rotational motions needed to around thirty-five; he was very conscious that this simplification was the main strength of his theory, and the reason it was preferable to Ptolemy's. (Slobodkin, 1992, p. 148)

    Although Ptolemy and Copernicus could explain the planetary orbits equally as well, the Copernican model was accepted because it was more parsimonious. Newton and then Einstein further revised the laws governing planetary motion in the same manner.

    The second type of parsimony is ontological parsimony. A theory is more ontologically parsimonious than another if it posits fewer types of things. Like epistemological parsimony, the principle of ontological parsimony attempts to conserve the number of assumptions that we must make. However, instead of dealing with nomonological concerns, ontological parsimony deals with metaphysical assumptions. Physicalism, the theory that only matter exists, is more ontologically parsimonious than dualism, the theory that matter and mind are fundamentally different entities. However, it remains to be seen if this is a compelling reason for accepting physicalism over dualism.

    The extension of the principle of parsimony from scientific to philosophical discourse is shown in the difference between epistemological and ontological parsimony. Because both disciplines deal with the search for truth, the philosophical use of ontological parsimony has the same justification as the scientific use of epistemological parsimony: "our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged" (Quine, 1961, p. 16).

    It could be argued that the principle of ontological parsimony has no justification. The problems that could arise from choosing a multi-entity ontology, such as deciding how to tell the types of entities apart, could outweigh any advantages of doing so. Also, the extension of the principle of parsimony into philosophical discourse can be argued against in principal. As one translator of Ockham states:

    What Ockham demands in his maxim is that everyone who makes a statement must have sufficient reason for its truth, 'sufficient reason' being defined as either the observation of a fact, or an immediate logical insight, or divine revelation, or a deduction from these. This principle of 'sufficient reason' is epistemological or methodological, certainly not an ontological axiom. (Boehner, 1957, p. xxi)

    The argument here is that the principle of parsimony should be limited to scientific discourse only. Only the number, and not the type, of entities should be conserved. Yet it seems reasonable that we should attempt to avoid needless complication and conserve assumptions not only in science, but in philosophy as well. For this reason, we should conclude that ontological parsimony has as much justification as epistemological parsimony.

    The third and last type of parsimony is linguistic parsimony, which allows statements to be made in shorter sentences. Pragmatically speaking, this is computationally less cumbersome. Imagine a language that is identical to English except that the word 'seventeen' is replaced by 'the number that is one more than sixteen and one less than eighteen.' This language would not be as linguistically parsimonious as English.

    This type of parsimony differs from the two other forms of parsimony. While epistemological and ontological parsimony attempt to conserve nomonological and metaphysical assumptions, linguistic parsimony only is concerned with how these assumptions are phrased. Despite this limitation, linguistic parsimony is a very serious concern, as we would not want to have to speak in a language in which it took all day to greet one another.

    Although this paper will use the terms ontological, epistemological, and linguistic when speaking of parsimony, it should be noted that simplicity and parsimony have been previously defined similarly. The three types of parsimony are similar to Herbert Feigl's three meanings of simplicity (Feigl, 1981, pp. 132-133). According to Feigl, material simplicity (similar to epistemological parsimony) is testable by empirical evidence. Occam-simplicity (which resemblances to ontological parsimony) deals with the metaphysical components that a theory posits. Formal simplicity deals with theories that "only differ from one another linguistically," much like linguistic parsimony.

    Parsimony is a relative characteristic; parsimony can only be used to describe one theory in comparison to another. Different types of parsimony can be in conflict with each other. A theory that is more ontologically parsimonious than its rivals may not be the most linguistically parsimonious. Which type of parsimony is preferred or should be maximized will be discussed later.

    Now that parsimony has been described and justified, let us turn to its limitations. Some limitations of the principle of parsimony are pointed out in Hilary Putnam's "Explanation and Reference" (Putnam, 1991, p. 182). For example, two simplest theories about different things may be in conflict. Because a contradiction would not be acceptable, the theory with the lesser relevant support should be abandoned. Also, the simplest theory may not fit with previous knowledge. Knowing only the fact that three points on a highway are in a straight line should yield the more parsimonious conclusion that the highway is a straight line. However, our previous knowledge of the existence of curves in roads makes this an improbable conclusion.

    It seems that some criteria must take precedence over parsimony, such as logical consistency, plausibility, and past evidence. In order to meet these criteria, only when two theories have equal support should the principle of parsimony be used to designate a preference. Putnam's examples point to an important required condition for the use of principle of parsimony: all other things must be equal. Otherwise, we would be forced to accept the more parsimonious claims that there are only four elements and five planets. Considering that we would have to explain away so much data to the contrary, it is simply not worth the effort. Parsimony should only be a concern between two theories with equal support: "The explicatum should be as simple as [similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness] permit" (Salmon, 1989, p. 5, from Carnap 1950/1962, Chapter 1). When the simplest theory does not fit the facts, it should be abandoned:

    What science does, in fact, is to select the simplest formula that will fit the facts. But this, quite obviously, is merely a methodological precept, not a law of nature. If the simplest formula ceases, after a time, to be applicable, the simplest formula that remains applicable is selected. (Russell, 1953, p. 401)

    The concept of parsimony is not only definable, but worthy of use as a guiding principle. This does not mean that the simplest theory is always true, but rather that it should be accepted over its rivals if all other things are equal: "Of the two competing explanations, both of which are consistent with the observed facts, we regard it as right and obligatory to prefer the simpler" (Barker, 1961, p. 273). Theories must of course be modified to fit the data that they describe: "Ockham's razor cannot overrule observed differences" (Polten, 1973, p. 127). Some confusion remains concerning the three defined types of parsimony: ontological, epistemological, and linguistic. As we shall see in the debate between the materialists and the dualists, it remains unclear which type of parsimony is of paramount importance."

    Tell him his argument that "God either is or is not, and 'God is not' is somehow parsimonious while 'God is' is not," is complete and utter nonsense.

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  16. I really hate to clog up your blog with off topic communications to other people (I hate, in fact, having anything to do with you) but you did take notice of the fact that I had deleted my comments, and you did say: "You mind me asking why the hell you deleted your comments?"
    There was some significance to the question, no?
    Also, mambochicken has no way to be contacted.
    So, rather than be misquoted, misinterpreted, and have things attributed to me that never occurred such as the explosion of my brain, because of something you did; I will post over here when my name is mentioned over on Oliver's blog.
    As long as people keep me alive over there, and choose to do what they have consistently done: Make up stuff about me, and mock me for it, then I will use your blog to answer those lies -- like the truth about why I was banned, which it seems Duros is reluctant to reveal, even though I told him. You don't see Oliver writing about it, do you?
    Seems to me that if he could declare publicly why Doc Pedro was being banned, he could declare why I was being banned.
    But he has not. You might think it was because I called "s" a catamite. That does not explain why Oliver waited about three days, and what, 10 or more comments, to ban me. Why not immediately?
    Secondly, If he told me different reasons, why would he not tell you those reasons?
    Third, people have asked him why, but he didn't say, "Because Frank called 's' a catamite."
    He has said nothing.
    And there is a reason for that.
    I don't know what it is, but there is a reason.

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  17. Frank, Oliver kicked you off his blog, if not for the catamite thing, then for the reason he apparently gave Duros, which is your predeliction to hijack threads for no good reason. In response you basically post a chapter from a textbook on philosophy, which frankly, I, having a life, cannot be bothered to read just to get to what the hell you might even be arguing, but its most likely off topic. Also, you seem like a semi-paranoiac by addressing my question about why you removed all your comments without addressing it, but saying theres some relevance to it that coincides with OW somehow, and I cant be bothered to even try to understand whatever convoluted logic youre using because, quite frankly, as I'm sure youre well aware, I dont particularly care much about what you think. You want to leave, then leave, and delete your comments or not, I really dont care, but you cant keep saying youre leaving and just keep staying to keep telling us how youre leaving, and dont pretend here or anywhere else that anybody really gives a shit about you. Eat dick, Frank.

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